Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 34

Issue 1

Article 7

5-15-2014

Navigating a Post America Invents Act World: How the LeahySmith America Invents Act Supports Small Businesses
Melissa Cerro

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Melissa Cerro, Navigating a Post America Invents Act World: How the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
Supports Small Businesses, 34 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary Iss. 1 (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol34/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Navigating a Post America Invents Act World: How the
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act Supports Small
Businesses
By Melissa Cerro*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 194
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF PATENT LAW .............................................. 198
III. THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT ..................................................... 200
IV. ADVANTAGES OF FIRST INVENTOR TO FILE UNDER THE AIA ... 201
V. ADVANTAGES OF § 102 PRIOR ART CHANGES UNDER THE AIA 205
VI. ADVANTAGES IN JOINDER CHANGES UNDER THE AIA.............. 216
VII. ADVANTAGES OF THE REVISED FEE STRUCTURE
AT THE USPTO ......................................................................... 218
VIII. ADVANTAGES OF INTER PARTES REVIEW ............................... 221
IX. POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS ........................................... 227
X. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 229

194

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

I.

34-1

INTRODUCTION

Patent applications and lawsuits have tripled in the last thirty
years. In 2012 alone, over 5,000 patent suits were filed 2 and the
number of patents granted increased by 11% for a total of 270,258.3
Patent examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and the district courts are striving to keep up with the
work, but this can be a daunting task. 4 Such burdens are partly
1

*Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. candidate 2014. I would like to
thank my family and friends for their invaluable support and encouragement over
the years. I would also like to recognize the Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary staff for their tireless efforts in preparing this piece
for publication.
1

Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and
Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2013).
2
CHRIS BARRY, ET AL., 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE
HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE 3 (2013), available at
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patentlitigation-study.pdf. See generally Xun (Michael) Liu, Joinder Under the AIA:
Shifting Non-practicing Entity Patent Assertions Away from Small Businesses, 19
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 490–91, 502 (2012). While there has
been a steady increase in patent litigation over the past few years, it is likely a
portion of the 2012 increase is due to the America Invents Act’s stricter joinder
rules for patent cases, making it more difficult to join together parties in patent
lawsuits. As a result, more suits are being filed individually. Id. See also Joe
Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 593 (2012) (acknowledging an increase in patent suits with
multiple defendants just prior to the AIA taking effect, such as the 175 defendants
who were sued by one plaintiff in the final hour before the new joinder law took
effect). For a further discussion of the AIA’s joinder impact on small businesses,
see infra Part VI.
3
BARRY, supra note 2, at 6.
4
Id. at 20–21. After examining 685 cases, it is noted that 70% of those cases
begin trial within three years from the point the complaint is filed to the first day of
trial. As the courts have seen an increase in caseload, there has been a slight
increase in the amount of time it takes to begin trial, but this has not been
significant. Id. See generally DATA VISUALIZATION CENTER: DECEMBER 2013
PATENTS
DATA,
AT
A
GLANCE,
USPTO,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited Jan. 13,
2014). As of December 2013, the USPTO had a backlog of a little more than
595,000 unexamined patent applications and an average traditional application was
pending for a little less than two and a half years. At the time, there were about
8,000 patent examiners. Id.; Alexander R. Trzeciak, Taboo, the Game: Patent
Office Edition—The New Preissuance Submissions Under the America Invents Act,
63 DUKE L.J. 245, 250 (2013) (noting it has also been estimated that patent

Spring 2014

Navigating a Post America Invents Act World

195

responsible for the “inconsistent quality” seen in recently granted
patents 5 and likely what led to the results of a 2013 study that
estimated 28% of already granted patents, if examined for
obviousness or anticipation, would fail.6 Concerns from the patent
community about bad patents passing through approval and their
impact on the economy are not new.7 An additional concern, until
recently, was that the U.S. was the last country to have a “first to
invent” patent system as opposed to a “first to file” system.8 All of
these concerns and many others are what prompted Congress in 2011
to pass what has been described by some as the most dramatic

examiners “spend only about eighteen hours reviewing a given patent
application”).
5
David Trilling, Note, Recent Development: Recognizing a Need for Reform:
The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
239, 240 (2012) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING
INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/reports/documents/patentreform_0.pdf.
6
Shawn P. Miller, supra note 1, at 6–7 (noting that certain technological
industries are worse than others, namely software and business methods would be
expected to be invalid 39% and 56% of the time, respectively, while other areas
such as medical, semiconductor, and energy patents tend to perform better than
average); see also Trzeciak, supra note 4, at 249 (finding in a 1998 study on patentvalidity that “46 percent of challenged patents had been held invalid”).
7
Trzeciak, supra note 4, at 249–50 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1515–20 (2001)
(“discussing ‘the social costs of bad patents’”)); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW
AND
POLICY
5–6
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; see also ECONOMICS AND
STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION AND UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS,
v
(Mar.
2012),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf. This U.S.
Commerce Department study, released in 2012, found that “IP [intellectual
property]-intensive industries accounted for about $5.06 trillion . . . or 34.8 percent
of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), in 2010.” This included about 3.9 million
jobs in “patent-intensive industries.” Id.
8
David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The
America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 520 n.10
(2013). The United States was last to abandon the “first to invent” system,
following the Philippines, which made the conversion in 1998. Id.
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legislation to affect patent law in the United States, at least since the
1950s—the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA).9
The AIA makes a number of significant changes to the patent
laws, one of the most publicized being the conversion from a “first to
invent” system to a “first inventor to file” system. 10 One of the
largest concerns with the AIA is that it disproportionately and
negatively impacts small businesses while favoring big businesses.11
Despite their size, small business inventors make important
contributions to the economy beyond hiring, such as promoting

9

Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AIA]; see AIA,
125 Stat. at 293 (describing a motivation of Congress to “provide inventors with
greater certainty regarding the scope of protection provided by the grant of
exclusive rights to their discoveries” and to harmonize the U.S. patent system with
foreign patent systems); Abrams & Wagner, supra note 8, at 519 (“On September
16, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law the Leahy–Smith America
Invents Act (AIA or the Act), almost certainly the most sweeping set of changes to
the U.S. patent system in almost sixty years.”).
10
Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4, 5, 78 (2012); see Abrams &
Wagner, supra note 8, at 519 n.8. The AIA was passed on September 16, 2011,
with certain sections being phased in through March 16, 2013. Many of the
changes will be addressed farther on in this Comment. Abrams & Wagner, supra
note 8, at 519 n.8.
11
See Eric A. Kelly, Is the Prototypical Small Inventor at Risk of Inadvertently
Eliminating Their Traditional One-Year Grace Period Under the American Invents
Act?—Interpreting “Or Otherwise Available to the Public” Per New § 102(a) and
“Disclosure” Per New § 102(b), 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 373, 374 (2013);
Jennifer L. Case, How the America Invents Act Hurts American Inventors and
Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82 UMKC L. REV. 29, 30–31, 62 (2013) (raising
the fact that large corporations’ lobbying efforts were a motivator behind the AIA
and that the predecessor to the AIA, discussed since 2005, failed to include
testimony from “startup companies or individual inventors” in the Senate Judiciary
Committee and had minimal input from these groups in the House Judiciary
Committee until 2009); see also U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Table of
Small Business Size Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification
System
Codes,
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf (last visited
Apr. 5, 2014). The Small Business Administration describes a small business as
having anywhere from 50 to 1500 employees, depending on the industry. Id. A
significant number, however, are defined as qualifying as a small business if they
have 500 or fewer employees. An exact number is not important for this Comment,
but rather helps to give an idea of the size of company that qualifies as a small
business.
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technological change. 12 A sense of protection for the homegrown
inventor, like Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak with the first Macintosh
computer or Thomas Edison with the first light bulb, is also
somewhat justified given that big businesses appear to have been a
motivator behind patent reform.13 However, further examination of
the AIA suggests that small businesses are not without significant
protections. While not written with only the small business inventor
in mind, the AIA provides several key advantages for small
businesses such as converting the U.S. to a first inventor to file
system,14 revising the definition of § 102 prior art,15 providing new
joinder requirements, 16 a new inter partes review proceeding,17 and
revising the fee schedule at the USPTO. 18 These advantages will
each be discussed in turn, but before that, Part II will give a brief
12

See Abrams & Wagner, supra note 8, at 530 (recognizing the contributions
small inventors make to the “innovation ecosystem” including “moving the pace of
technological change forward” and “serv[ing] as important innovation inputs into
larger, established companies” such as in the pharmaceutical industry); see Liu,
supra note 2, at 499–500 (referencing a U.S. Small Business Administration
posting that small businesses in the U.S. are responsible for “half of all private
sector employees” and “generated 65% of new jobs in the last seventeen years”).
13
See Charles E. Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, Beware the Suppression of
District-Court Jurisdiction of Administrative Decisions in Patent–validity
Challenges Under the America Invents Act: A Critical Analysis of a Legislative
Black Swan in an Age of Preconceived Notions and Special-interest Lobbying, 95 J.
PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 124, 135 (2013); Case, supra note 11, at 60, n.205
(citing Renee Kaswan et al., Patent Reform: Effects on Medical Innovation
Businesses, 2 MED. INNOVATION & BUS. 11, 11 (2010)) (“As introduced in 2005,
the Patent Reform Act reflected the concerns of two large lobbying coalitions, the
Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform headed by several large pharmaceutical
and manufacturing companies, and the Coalition for Patent Fairness headed by the
large information technology companies.”).
14
See Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011: Navigating
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform,
93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441, 467 (2012). The first inventor to file
system dictates that the application received by the USPTO first, when there are
multiple applications for the same invention are filed, will receive priority. Id.
15
See id. at 468. Prior art is a listing of categories or occurrences that will bar
approval of a patent application due to the fact that the invention is not novel.
16
Id. at 453. The AIA specifically restricts the reasons why parties in a
lawsuit may be joined together into one suit. Id.
17
Id. at 459. Inter partes review serves as a method for the non-patent owner
to challenge the validity of a patent on limited grounds. Id.
18
Id. at 447–48. The fee schedule determines the costs for specific services
with the USPTO depending on what type of inventor or company is seeking the
service. Id.
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history of patent law in order to provide some perspective on the
substantial changes made by the AIA. Part III will briefly address
the AIA. This will be followed by a discussion on how the AIA’s
development has affected small businesses in the United States. Part
IV will specifically address the advantages of the “first inventor to
file” system for small businesses, followed by the § 102 prior art
changes in Part V, the joinder changes in Part VI, the revised fee
structure at the USPTO in Part VII, and the new inter partes review
proceedings in Part VIII. Finally, Part IX will discuss possible future
improvements to the AIA that could further aid small businesses,
followed by the conclusion in Part X.
II.

BRIEF HISTORY OF PATENT LAW

Congress’s ability to create patent laws stems from Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which states Congress
has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”19
The patent laws have been significantly revised only a
handful of times since the first Patent Act of 1790, including in 1793,
1836, 1839, 1939, 1952, 1994, 1999, and 2011.20 The most recent
significant patent revision, outside of the AIA, was the Patent Act of
1952, which structured federal law into statute, serving as a
“culmination of 160 years of developing patent law, selectively
incorporating some of the provisions in prior statutes, [and] codifying
sensible judicial precedents.”21 The Patent Act of 1952 also created a
key patent requirement that the invention could no longer be obvious
19

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Case, supra note 11, at 52; Armitage, supra note 10, at 9. Prior to the 1800s,
it was notable that patents were not granted if they were publicly or commercially
used before a patent application was filed. Case, supra note 11, at 52. In the
1800s, the patent office was created, the “novelty” requirement for all patents was
created, and a two-year grace period for public or commercial use was introduced.
Id. This grace period for a patent owner to file a patent application after a public or
commercial use was later reduced to one year in 1939. Id.
21
Miller & Archibald, supra note 13, at 134; Trilling, supra note 5, at 243; see
also Case, supra note 11, at 54. Rules pertaining to conception of an idea,
reduction to practice, diligent efforts to reduce that idea to practice, and
abandonment of an idea were among the many rules codified in the 1952 Patent
Act. Case, supra note 11, at 54 These were all pertinent to patent prosecution up
until the implementation of the AIA. Id.
20
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and still receive the luxury of a limited monopoly.22 Still, maintained
in the Patent Act of 1952 was the first to invent system and the
requirement that patent applicants had to act with good faith and had
“an affirmative duty to disclose information” related to their
invention. 23 The time frame for patents also could vary widely
depending on the motivation level of the patent applicant since
patents expired seventeen years after the patent was issued, not after
it was requested. 24 This left an expiration range between eighteen
and fifty years for some patents.25 Additionally, until recent decades,
invalid but granted patents could not be contested.26 Lastly, the court
process for challenging patents gave challengers great freedom in
allowing them to attack any decision made by the patent holder in the
application process, and did not limit attacks to material similarities
in the inventions.27
In 1980, the Patent Act created the “‘ex parte reexamination’
procedure,” which meant the public could address some concerns of
an already issued patent with the USPTO.28 After the 1980s, there
were two pieces of legislation, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
of 1994 29 and the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, 30
which further expanded patent rights.31 Combined, these two laws
required the majority of patent pending applications to be published
within eighteen months of the initial filing date, restricted most
patents to twenty year terms from the filing date, rather than the date
the patent was granted, and created an inter partes reexamination
process for specific issues.32

22

Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103 (1952). Nonobviousness has served as a
key requirement for patentability since the 1952 Act.
23
Armitage, supra note 10, at 6, 8.
24
Id. at 7.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 6.
27
Id. at 7–8.
28
Id. at 9. The ex parte reexamination procedure restricted the public’s
involvement in the process and has not been put to widespread use. Id.
29
Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4001, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A552 (1999).
30
Id.
31
Armitage, supra note 10, at 9.
32
Id. The inter partes reexamination process, like the ex parte reexamination,
was very limited in this case “to very narrow patentability issue arising from
patents and printed publications.” Id.
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THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT

As mentioned above, many have expressed that the AIA is a
significant piece of legislation. Even the USPTO considers it one of
the most impactful pieces of legislation since 1836. 33 President
Obama signed the AIA into law on September 16, 2011; however, it
took Congress six years and several attempts to write the bill and get
it passed through both houses of Congress.34
The AIA made both procedural and substantive changes to
the U.S. patent system, with some of the most impactful changes
being a conversion to the “first inventor to file system”; altering the
prior art language, which directly impacts both the novelty and
obviousness assessments; revising and creating new procedures to
address challenges to granted patents, such as the inter partes review;
and revising the fee structure. 35 The AIA also set up an
implementation timeline, which phased different sections in over an
eighteen-month period. For example, while the first inventor to file
system did not take effect until March 16, 2013, the new fee schedule
took effect immediately on September 16, 2011.36

33

Kelly, supra note 11, at 375. It should be noted that the author Eric Kelly is
a law student and patent examiner who self-admittedly framed the analysis of his
article in favor of the small inventor.
34
Trilling, supra note 5, at 245 (citing a statement by Senator Leahy); Bui,
supra note 14, at 441–42 (noting that Congress had been tying to pass patent
reforms since 2005 and since that time unsuccessfully passed the Patent Reform
Act of 2005, the Patent Reform Act of 2006, the Patent Reform Act of 2007, the
Patent Reform Act of 2009, and the Patent Reform Act of 2010); see also Trilling,
supra note 5, at 244–45. Even still, the AIA was at risk of not being passed either,
when after voting on it and sending it to the House of Representatives for approval,
it was returned to the Senate with an amendment “creat[ing] a ‘reserve fund’” for
money received by the USPTO beyond what Congress appropriated for it. Id. Due
in large part to efforts on Senator Leahy’s part, the amended version passed the
Senate without alteration. Id. at 245.
35
Armitage, supra note 10, at 11; Christopher Brown, Survey: Intellectual
Property Law: Developments in Intellectual Property Law, 45 IND. L. REV. 1243,
1243 (2012). See generally Trilling, supra note 5.
36
Brown, supra note 35, at 1243–44; Bui, supra note 14, at 447–48.
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ADVANTAGES OF FIRST INVENTOR TO FILE UNDER THE AIA

One of the more publicized changes in the AIA is the switch
from a first to invent system to a first inventor to file system.37 The
previous first to invent system generally granted the patent to the
inventor who could prove—sometimes by swearing in an oath—that
she was the first to invent the invention.38 At times, this could mean
that even if one inventor filed her patent application before another
application for the same invention, even though she was unaware of
the other invention, she may not receive the patent since her
application was filed later.39 For example, if inventor B arrived at the
same invention, Widget X, independently and close in time with but
after another inventor A, and if B filed her patent application in April
2010, before A’s application in June 2010, A will still be awarded the
patent so long as she can show she was the first to invent widget X.
Section 3 of the AIA sets the “effective filing date” to be “the
actual filing date of the patent or the application for the patent
containing a claim to the invention; or (B) the filing date of the
earliest application for which the patent or application is entitled,”
essentially transforming the U.S. from a first to invent system to a
type of first to file system.40 This change now means that inventor B
in our example above would be granted the patent since she filed her
patent application prior to inventor A, regardless of the fact that
inventor A created the invention first. As Congress made clear, this
is not a shift to a purely first to file system, but rather a first inventor
to file system.41 This means that a non-inventor, absent one of the
approved legal rights to the invention, may not be awarded a patent.42
37

AIA, 125 Stat. at 285; see also, Paul M. Janicke, Overview of the Patents
Law of the Unites States, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 63, 64–65 (2013); Gene
Quinn, A Simple Guide to the AIA Oddities: First to File, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 11,
2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/09/11/a-simple-guide-to-theaia-oddities-first-to-file/id=45104/. The U.S. does not have a strict “first to file”
system as understood internationally, but rather a “first inventor to file” system.
Quinn, supra note 37. One key difference between the two systems is the retention
of a grace period for public disclosures of the invention made by the inventor or a
third party who derived the invention from the inventor. Id.
38
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 135, 291 (2006); Dargaye Churnet, Article,
Patent Claims Revisited, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 501, 510–11 (2013).
39
Churnet, supra note 38.
40
AIA § 3(a)(2)(i)(1)(A)–(B), 125 Stat. at 285.
41
See id. Section 3 is entitled “FIRST INVENTOR TO FILE.” Id.
Subsections 3(o)–(p) also explain that it was the sense of Congress to shift to a
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The rationale behind the first inventor to file change was in
part to better align the United States with other patent systems around
the world, such as Japan and Europe, in order to promote better
“certainty” for inventors interested in pursuing other international
patents. 43 First inventor to file promotes this goal because many
other countries will not patent an invention that has been previously
disclosed to the public.44 This would have been the case with our
earlier example where B filed first but invented second. Under the
old first to invent system, A would be able to receive a U.S. patent,
but would be denied a patent in many other countries due to B’s
public disclosure of the invention prior to the filing of A’s patent
application. An additional rationale, as described by Congress, was
to promote the constitutional fundamentals of securing limited
monopolies in exchange for patents, and also to “provide inventors
with greater certainty regarding the scope of protection provided by”
those monopolies.45
There are several arguments against the first inventor to file
system. Firstly, that the first inventor to file system creates a “race to
“first inventor to file” system. AIA § 3(o)–(p), 125 Stat. at 293. Ironically, while it
is clear Congress intended to create a “first inventor to file” system, and permitted
inventor(s) to file a patent application, Congress also permitted non-inventors to be
able to successfully file patents. AIA § 4(b), 125 Stat. at 296. See Armitage, supra
note 10, at 20, 94 (citing that while pre-AIA legislation required the patent
applicant and inventor to be one and the same, § 118 of the AIA permits both direct
assignees and assignees by obligation to file patent applications independently so
long as the inventor is named in the application).
42
See AIA §§ 3(a)(2)(f), 4(b), 125 Stat. at 293 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§
100 and 118 respectively). Section 3(a)(2)(f) defines an inventor as the person or
persons “who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.” Id.
Section 4(b) of the AIA also sets the parameters for patents filings by parties other
than the inventor, including those who are assigned or have a legal right to be
assigned the invention and those who “show[] sufficient proprietary interest in the
matter.” Id.
43
Alexa L. Ashworth, Race You to the Patent Office! How the New Patent
Reform Act Will Affect Technology Transfer at Universities, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 383, 395 (2013); AIA § 3(p), 125 Stat. at 293. Congress felt that by making
the U.S. a “first inventor to file” country it would “promote harmonization of the
United States patent system with . . . nearly all other countries throughout the world
with whom the United States conducts trade and thereby promote greater
international uniformity and certainty in the procedures used for securing the
exclusive rights of inventors to their discoveries.” AIA § 3(p), 125 Stat. at 293.
44
Brown, supra note 35, at 1252.
45
AIA § 3(o), 125 Stat. at 293.
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file” with the patent office, which promotes more patent applications,
some of which will not encompass the full invention but rather only
the part of the invention that is ready for patenting at that time.46
This in turn will require additional future patent applications to
encompass the rest of the invention’s improvements.47 Furthermore,
it is argued that such behavior is more suited for larger businesses
that have legal teams and adequate funding to file multiple patents in
piecemeal.48 Supporters of this view also point to the first to invent
system as protecting small businesses from this type of activity
because as long as the inventor was still making progress on her
invention, she could seek a patent—and pay the expense only once—
at the end of making the invention.49 A further consequence offered
by the first inventor to file system, is that due to staffing and funding,
a small inventor will be at a disadvantage for even completing the
invention before a large company completes its invention.50 Lastly, it
is argued that the lawsuits filed, under the first inventor to file
system, against small businesses, will result in high litigation costs
before the inventor has had an opportunity to recoup some of her
investment and therefore before she is in a financial position to afford
litigation.51
The change to the first inventor to file system, while it may
not affect many businesses overall,52 provides small businesses with
46

Bui, supra note 14, at 468 (noting that in the rush, an applicant may also
draft the patent application too quickly, leading to a lesser quality in the finished
product); Ammon Lesher & Tom Vanderbloemen, Patent Reform 101: What Every
South Carolina Lawyer Should Know, 24 S.C. LAW. 28, 30 (2012).
47
Lesher & Vanderbloemen, supra note 46, at 30.
48
Id.; Richard G. Braun, America Invents Act: First-to-file and a Race to the
Patent Office, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 47, 58 (2013). Larger
companies usually have legal teams on retainer and larger legal budgets. Braun,
supra note 48, at 58. For example, it is Apple, Inc.’s policy to file a patent for all
new ideas, regardless if the company has an intention at the time to use that idea.
Id. To accomplish this goal, Apple’s engineers and attorneys meet monthly to
discuss such ideas. Id.
49
Lesher & Vanderbloemen, supra note 46, at 30; Case, supra note 11, at 50
(noting this type of behavior is more beneficial for those parties sensitive to cost).
50
Abrams & Wagner, supra note 8, at 520.
51
Case, supra note 11, at 61 (presuming this will particularly be the case in
derivation proceedings, which under the AIA are used to determine if a third party
unfairly derived the invention from another).
52
Bui, supra note 14, at 467 (noting that many businesses already operate
under a first inventor to file system due to the international implications of not for
attaining foreign patents).
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many important advantages that the opposition fails to consider.
Firstly, by converting to a first inventor to file country, the U.S.
aligns with the rest of the international community, preventing the
unknowing small business from accidentally losing her ability to file
international patents, due to an acceptable public disclosure under the
U.S.’s old first to invent system, but an unacceptable public
disclosure around the world, as demonstrated in the example above.53
Due to their inexperience with the patent system domestically and
internationally, small businesses are more susceptible to this type of
mistake, leading to an invention that may only be patentable in the
U.S. This protection of future international expansion may also make
small businesses in particular more attractive to venture capitalists or
larger companies that would be interested in purchasing them later
because of the financial incentive to expand in other countries. 54
Essentially, by maintaining the possibility of patenting in other
countries, the first inventor to file system helps to make U.S. small
business patents more valuable than they may otherwise have been
under the first to invent system.
One concern mentioned above of the new first to invent
system is that it puts small businesses in a financially undesirable
position when they have to defend lawsuits at an early stage in their
patent. However, this argument fails to consider that the interference
proceedings under the first to invent system ran a very similar risk.
The interference proceedings were previously a way to prove up, in a
mini-trial like setting during the patent application stage, that one
inventor invented the patentable subject matter before the other
inventor.55 These proceedings could be expensive and often required
extensive documentation that had to meet certain validation
53

This presumes that, under the new first inventor to file system, the inventor
does not publicly disclose his or her invention prior to filing the application. The
risks associated with public disclosure will be addressed in Part V of this
Comment. Because a small business may not originally have international
expectations for patenting, the old first to invent system left them vulnerable to
being locked out of international patents in the future.
54
Jay P. Kesan, Rebuttal: The Potential to Make Progress, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNumbra 234, 236 (2012) (noting that small businesses engaged in the life
sciences and pharmaceuticals are already familiar with the importance of foreign
patents, however with the global economy this is becoming increasingly important
in various technological areas as well).
55
See id. (noting that due to rules favoring larger businesses in interference
proceedings, many small businesses prior to the AIA were not “relying
predominantly on the first to invent system”).
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requirements, which may have been unknown to an individual
inventor or small business and therefore never maintained.56 Instead,
the first inventor to file system saves the applicant from the time and
expense of such a proceeding by setting a clear rule for which party
should receive the patent if both parties made the same invention.57
A final benefit of the first inventor to file system is that it
encourages applicants to file early. 58 While it is argued by the
opposition that this is a detriment, such a promotion furthers the
values of the Constitution in that limited monopolies are given in
exchange for the disclosure of the invention to the public. The first
inventor to file system, by promoting early filing, benefits the public
by permitting access to such information sooner than it may have
otherwise been provided. This will benefit small businesses by
furthering the development and progress of the “the useful arts” and
making the information of large company competitors accessible to
small businesses sooner. All in all, the underling intentions of
Congress and the potential benefits internationally and financially
make the change to the first inventor to file system a benefit to small
businesses.
V.

ADVANTAGES OF § 102 PRIOR ART CHANGES UNDER THE AIA

One key area of patent law is what constitutes prior art. 59
Before the AIA took effect, a patent could be invalidated using prior
56

See Bui, supra note 14, at 467–68. It is often easier to train small businesses
to file early than to teach them how to keep proper documentation to satisfy an
interference proceeding. Id. at 468. Additionally, Bui recognized that an American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Report of the Economic Survey of
2011 found that a more simplistic “preliminary phase or discovery” could cost
nearly half a million dollars. Id. at 468 n.183.
57
Id. at 467 (recognizing that the change to a first inventor to file system sets a
“bright line standard that is easier to determine priority right disputes amongst
inventors”).
58
Marin Cionca, 200 Years of American Patent Law Tradition—Gone! An
Overview of the 2011 America Invents Act, 54 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 10, 11 (Feb.
2012) (noting the first to invent system creates either “pressure or incentive to file
early”).
59
See Bui supra note 14, at 468. Prior art includes the events and occurrences
that can prevent a patent application from being approved. Id. Before the AIA,
prior art could include “prior public knowledge, prior use by others, prior printed
publication, prior patent, prior public use, prior sale or offer for sale, and prior
invention.” Id.
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art to show that the invention failed to meet the 35 U.S.C. § 103
requirement of non-obviousness as of the time the invention was
created.60 By comparing the invention to the permitted types of prior
art in § 102, it could be determined if the invention was obvious to a
person of reasonable skill in the art, and if so, a patent would not be
granted. 61 Therefore, the types of § 102 prior art allowed for
comparison dictate whether certain information could be used to
disqualify a patent application. Before the AIA, § 102(a) limited
prior art to patents, publications, public uses, and offers for sale.62
Old § 102 used to state in part:
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right
to patent
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the
invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use
or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United
States, or (c) he has abandoned the invention, or (d)
the invention was first patented or caused to be
patented, or was the subject of an investor’s certificate
. . . filed more than twelve months before the filing of
the application in the United States63
The AIA, however, tacked on to the end of that listing the
phrase “otherwise available to the public,” so 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
now reads: “(a) Novelty; prior art. A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless—(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
60

Id. at 473 (explaining that the AIA simplified § 103 by requiring that the
invention was not obvious at the time of the filing date versus at the time the
invention was made as with the pre-AIA patent laws).
61
Brown, supra note 35, at 1248.
62
Case, supra note 11, at 58 (referencing the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. §
102(a)) [The pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 102 will hereinafter be referred to as
“Old § 102”].
63
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(d) (2006) (amended 2011).
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to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention”64
The impact of this difference again can be far ranging since §
102 affects not just novelty, but § 103 obviousness and the grace
period 65 as applied to third parties, and the very limits of what is
patentable.66
Comparing the two statutes’ requirements for novelty, it is
clear that patented, printed publications, public use, and on sale are
not new concepts to patent law, and in fact much case law exists
interpreting these terms.67 The real question regarding New § 102 is
whether the added phrase is a unique fifth category, which broadens
the scope of prior art, or if it serves as a qualifier to prior categories.68
The direction of this interpretation may have a significant impact on
the strategy taken by small businesses.
One possible interpretation of the new phrase “otherwise
available to the public” is that it further qualifies or defines the
previous categories barring a patent, rather than creating a new fifth
64

35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2013) (emphasis added) [The AIA version of § 102
will hereinafter be referred to as “New § 102”].
65
See Heath W. Hoglund et al., A Different State of Grace: The New Grace
Period Under the AIA, 5 No. 6 LANDSLIDE 48, 48–49 (July/Aug. 2013). Prior to
the AIA, publications within one year of a patent filing by another party would not
prevent patent approval based on a lack of novelty. Id. at 48. However, the AIA
now requires that the inventor be the first person to make such a public disclosure.
Id. The public disclosure does not extend to undescribed, obvious variations
invented by a third party, which then could no longer be patentable by either the
patent applicant or the inventor. Id.
66
Paul Morgan, The Ambiguity in Section 102(a)(1) of the Leahy–Smith
America Invents Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O PATENT LAW REV. 29, 29 (2011) (“New
§102 will become the new definer of bars of patentability, novelty and §103 prior
art for all such patent applications, and patents granted therefrom.”)
67
See id. (“These terms have all been taken directly from the present § 102.”).
“Old § 102(b) identifies four classes of prior art: patents, printed publications,
public use, and on sale.” Kelly, supra note 11, at 381. “Because all the other prior
art categories have been listed in Old § 102(b) since 1952, extensive case law is at
hand providing much guidance for what these traditional categories of prior art
mean.” Id. at 382.
68
Case, supra note 11, at 58 (qualifying “otherwise available to the public” as
a “new category” and a fifth action “bar[ring] a patent”); Kelly, supra note 11, at
393 (arguing in favor of “otherwise available to the public” serving as “a condition
precedent on what constitutes prior art” rather than its own unique category);
Morgan, supra note 66, at 30 (illustrating the possibility of both options based on
harmonization internationally and the legislative record leading up to the passage
of the AIA).
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category. This interpretation seems to be the most likely given the
legislative record, prior interpretations of Old § 102, and potential
policy implications of a broader definition.69 But which categories?
Does the phrase limit all four categories or is it narrower, limiting
just the preceding categories of “public use” and “on sale”? The
grammatical and sentence structure of the clause suggests the latter.
Furthermore, a Senate floor statement by Senator Kyl just prior to
passing the AIA also indicates the structure and intent of Congress
was to apply “otherwise available to the public” only to “public use”
and “on sale.”70 Given that patents are published for the public to see
within eighteen months and printed publications are by their very
nature public, there is no reason to include them in the same grouping
as “public use” and “on sale.” This distinction is also illustrated by
the use of “or” between “patented, described in a printed publication”
and “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public.” The
first “or” helps to establish three categories: (1) “patented”; (2)
“described in a printed publication”; and (3) “in public use, on sale,
or otherwise available to the public.” Breaking down the grammar
this way demonstrates why only the third category is modified by the
phrase “or otherwise available to the public.” Furthermore, while the
wording and connotations of “in public use” and “on sale,” suggests
that these terms would have otherwise been understood to be
“available to the public,” the courts, in fact, have held that these
69

Because § 102 of the AIA only took effect on March 16, 2013, there have
not been any judicial decisions interpreting the new language. In the alternative,
the USPTO could issue administrative regulations or publish an update to the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP), however, neither of these events
has occurred. The latest revision for the MPEP was published in August 2012.
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES, MPEP (2014) (Aug. 2011),
available
at
http://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/manual/MPEP/e8r9/d0e18.xml#/manual/MPE
P/e8r9/d0e18.xml (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
70
See 157 CONG. REC. S1360 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Senator
Jon Kyl) (addressing the grammatical and sentence structure of § 102(a)(1), states
that “the clause ‘or otherwise available to the public’ [being] set off from its
preceding clauses by a comma confirms that it applies to both ‘public use’ and ‘on
sale’”). Additionally, there are few Congressional Records defining or describing
“otherwise available to the public.” Kelly, supra note 11, at 384. It has been
suggested with so few “meaningful references,” all of which were found in the
Senate Records, “that by the time the bill S. 23 (the Senate version of the AIA)
made it to the House as H.R. 1249 (the House of Representatives version of the
AIA), Congress in its entirety was in agreement as to the meaning of ‘or otherwise
available to the public.’” Id.
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activities, even performed in secrecy, could still bar patentability.71
It appears in fact that it was this very type of judicial precedent
Congress was trying to overturn with the addition of “otherwise
available to the public,” and thus the distinction of this third category
was necessary.72
Interestingly, it is the interplay between the “general public
availability standard” Senator Kyl speaks of and the other § 102(a)(1)
change of eliminating geographic restrictions on public use, sales,
and knowledge that clarifies the importance of removing secret uses
and sales as a bar.73 The other § 102(a)(1) change now includes both

71

The courts have interpreted “public use” and “on sale” to bar patentability
even when done in secret. See Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto
Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946). The Second Circuit held that secret
commercialization of an invention beyond the grace period will invalidate a patent
or prevent the granting of a patent. Id. As Judge Learned Hand stated, an inventor
“must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.” Id. at 520. The
Metallizing doctrine “is based on strong public and patent policy arguments against
allowing an inventor to first make commercial advantage of an invention through
secret commercial use and then to later protect the invention with patent rights.”
Morgan, supra note 66, at 31.
72
The seminal case that barred patentability of a secret use as being a public
use was Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333 (1881), where the Court held that a
particular spring sewn into a corset that was worn under clothing was deemed a
“public use.” See 157 CONG. REC. S1360 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of
Sen. Jon Kyl). Senator Kyl describes one of the purposes of New § 102(a)(1) to be
to “abrogate[] the rule announced in Egbert v. Lippman.” Id. Senator Kyl
continues by stating that § 102 creates a “general public availability standard” and
eliminates secret prior art. Id. Further support is provided in Senate Report 110259, which addressed S. 1145, the 110th Congress’s predecessor to the AIA. S.
REP. NO. 110-259 (Jan. 24, 2008). That report clarified that “the phrase ‘otherwise
available to the public’” was added to § 102 “to make clear that secret collaborative
agreements, which are not available to the public, are not prior art.” Id.
73
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006). Old § 102 stated,
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(a) the
invention was known or used by others in this county, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States.
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domestic and foreign public uses and sales as a bar to patentability.74
As a result, inventors who enter secret sales may find themselves in
the unenviable position of trying to prove a secret deal that took place
on foreign soil, when trying to attain domestic patents rights.75
An alternative interpretation of the new phrase “otherwise
available to the public” is that it was meant as a new fifth category to
bar patentability, broadening the scope of areas where disclosures
would no longer be permitted, for example oral presentations at
professional conferences. 76 The creation of a fifth “catchall”
category, while broadening the scope, would be consistent with long
held U.S. patent policy that inventions in public should not be given
monopoly advantages of a patent. 77 By applying the alternative
argument above where secret use or sales would no longer constitute
prior art to bar a patent, an inventor is provided with an opportunity
to extend his monopoly beyond the allowed twenty-year patent
term.78 This, however, seems to run directly against the grain of the
Constitution’s intent.79
74

See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011). New § 102 no longer has a geographic
boundary for prior art.
75
157 CONG. REC. S1360 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
(such a situation, according to Senator Kyl, leaves U.S. inventors at “risk of having
their inventions stolen through fraud”). It also presents challenges for discovery of
non-public information available only on foreign soil.
76
Morgan, supra note 66, at 30 (speculating that the new phrase may be a
“‘catch all’ to cover other public disclosures such as oral public presentations at
technical meetings, internet postings, etc.”). This type of expansion would go
beyond the pre-AIA requirements of being a “printed publication” or “public use.”
See also Case, supra note 11, at 58 (adding a fifth category to prior art under the
AIA).
77
One of the principles Egbert v. Lippman reinforced was that an inventor
could not artificially extend his monopoly beyond the patent term by using or
selling his invention in secret. 104 U.S. 333 (1881). The alternative argument
presented above “vastly departs from patent common law with respect to public use
and on sale.” See Kelly, supra note 11, at 387. Such a departure leads one to
question if that was the true intent of this bipartisan piece of legislation.
78
157 CONG. REC. S1360 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
Senator Kyl feels “there is no reason to fear ‘commercialization’ that merely
consists of a secret sale or offer for sale but that does not operate to disclose the
invention to the public” since inventors will be adequately motivated to file their
patent first or risk losing the opportunity to a competitor. Id.
79
As addressed above, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 allows Congress to
promote the “useful arts” by providing monopolies to inventors for “limited
Times.” Permitting an inventor to essentially maintain a trade secret and then
patent that trade secret and enjoy the additional twenty-year monopoly fails to
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One additional concern raised with the first interpretation and
therefore in support of the second “catchall” interpretation is the
argument that the Supreme Court requires “that ‘in order to abrogate
a common-law principle, the statute must “speak directly” to the
question addressed by the common law.’”80 In this case, the question
would be whether a secret use or sale constitutes prior art. It does not
appear, based on the language of the statute, that the phrase “or
otherwise available to the public” is specific enough to this question
to “speak directly” to it. However, as noted, Senator Kyl’s
statements prior to the Senate’s vote went uncontested both in the
Senate and later in the House of Representatives, suggesting it was
the intent of Congress to not permit a secret use or sale to qualify as
prior art.81
One main concern with the confusion described above is that
it will lead to unnecessary and expensive litigation in order to clearly
understand the proper interpretation of § 102(a)(1) and its
implications.82 Additionally, this confusion will lead to questions in
determining a patent strategy for businesses. The first interpretation
that narrows the scope of “public use” and “on sale” to only those
activities performed in public has several advantages for the small
business inventor, the most important being that it protects her from
what she does not know.83 It seems much easier to just have a rule
that says any “public use” or “sales” available to the public could bar
honor the Constitutional purpose of promoting “the useful arts” and furthering
society’s understanding of technology. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan.
City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent monopoly was . . . a reward, an
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge . . . . Only inventions and discoveries
which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special
inducement of a limited private monopoly.”); see also Kelly, supra note 11, at 402
(arguing that “under New § 102(a), secret use not coupled with public use of the
product would not constitute prior art at all, because New § 102(a)’s public
accessibility requirement does not concern itself with secret use but only use that
results in products which are then made available to the public”).
80
Kelly, supra note 11, at 387 (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,
534 (1993)).
81
Id.
82
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent
Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O PATENT L. REV. 12, 25 (2011).
83
Kelly, supra note 11, at 387. The interpretation supported in Senator Kyl’s
Senate Floor statement aids the small inventor in situations where she may be
unaware that disclosing her invention to someone will forfeit her opportunity to
patent later, such as in the case of Egbert v. Lippman. Id.
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a patent than to expect inventors, especially small business inventors,
without in-house counsel or patent lawyers on retainer, to know that
some secret sales or secret uses could also bar a patent by qualifying
as a public use or sale. Furthermore, requiring acts to be public helps
to protect small businesses reaching out to investors and venture
capitalists for necessary project funding. 84 The counter to this
argument is that small inventors in particular, who disclose
patentable information to others, such as potential financial
supporters or venture capitalists, risk those parties taking the
information and making it public, thus barring patentability for the
inventor. 85 An example would be if inventor A privately shared
information about her new light bulb invention with a venture
capitalist she was approaching for funding, who was unaware until
after A’s pitch presentation that the company was already investing
in an older light bulb competitor. 86 In an effort to reduce
competition, the information could simply be leaked to the public and
then bar the new patent.87 Since it is generally against practice to
sign a confidentiality agreement,88 instead one way an inventor can
protect herself from this type of unethical behavior is to simply file a
provisional patent application prior to meeting with any investors.89
Filing a provisional application will not only protect the inventor
from such aggressive tactics, but will preserve the opportunity to file
84

Id. at 411 (arguing that because prior art under the AIA has to be publicly
available, “small inventors are encouraged to pursue venture capitalist financing
and other collaborative partnerships without fear of creating damaging prior art”);
Under the AIA, confidential pre-selling of inventions would not bar a patent, even
when done beyond the one-year grace period. Kari Barnes, America Invents Act—
Now What?, 55 ORANGE CNTY. LAW 30, 30 (2013). The key is that the actions
must be confidential, including any marketing. Id. To avoid any risk that such
actions may not be deemed confidential, a provisional application should be filed.
Id.
85
Case, supra note 11, at 59.
86
Id. at 63–64 (providing the example of the venture capitalist who, originally
unaware of the conflict, discloses the invention to the public in order to reduce the
risk of competition with a pre-existing investment).
87
Id. (noting it is in the competitor’s interest to not cooperate with the
inventor).
88
Id. at 64.
89
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2013). Prior art publicly disclosed by the inventor, such as
in a provisional application, permits a one-year grace period to file the nonprovisional application. Id. A provisional patent application would start the clock
and require a patent application to be filed within one year, but it reserves the
original filing date for the inventor. Id.
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many foreign patents, demonstrating to investors a sophisticated level
of business organization and foresight.90
Alternatively, if the information were instead filed in a patent
application by, for example the venture capitalist group, the AIA’s
derivation hearing would allow the inventor to challenge the
application based on it being derived from the inventor and therefore
the applicant would not qualify as a true inventor of the
information.91 One big concern with this approach is the cost of the
derivation proceeding.92 And while this concern further draws out
the point of why filing a provisional application is so important in
order to try to avoid such a situation, the cost should not be
prohibitive in most cases. Rather, a derivation proceeding, which
ultimately is the replacement to the exceedingly expensive
interference proceeding under the first to invent system, presents the
small business inventor with a cost-efficient option for protecting her
invention considering it is only $400 to file a derivation proceeding
with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) plus any attorneys’

90

Kelly, supra note 11, at 411; see also Brown, supra note 35, at 1252
(recognizing that many foreign patents require “absolute novelty” and will not
permit prior public disclosures).
91
See infra Part IV. A patent will only be granted to someone who qualifies as
an inventor as defined by the AIA. Stealing an invention and presenting it as your
own will not satisfy this requirement. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2) (2013).
An applicant for patent may file a petition with respect to an
invention to institute a derivation proceeding in the Office. The
petition shall set forth with particularity the basis for finding that
an individual named in an earlier application as the inventor or a
joint inventor derived such invention from an individual named
in the petitioner’s application as the inventor or joint inventor
and, without authorization, the earlier application claiming such
invention was filed.
35 U.S.C. § 135(a)(1) (2013). There has been much speculation as to whether
these proceedings will be widely used or one of the least likely to be used
provisions in the AIA. Ashworth, supra note 43, at 392; Janicke, supra note 37, at
86, 87 (noting that these proceedings will also be heard by the PTAB and if the
assertions are successfully proven, the patent claims will be invalidated).
92
Case, supra note, 11 at 61 (arguing that the costs of a derivation proceeding
will be prohibitive to small businesses, particularly given that much of the
information needed to prove their case will be in the hands of a third party and
difficult for the inventor to access).
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fees.93 These fees however should not be excessive so long as the
true inventor has either the materials given to the venture capitalist
firm, which were likely used to derive the invention, or her own
records of creating the invention.94 If so, these materials can simply
be attached to the patent application filed by the venture capitalist in
order to demonstrate the overwhelming similarity between the two
inventions.95
This interpretation has one more big advantage for small
businesses, particularly now at the beginning of the AIA. Transitions
in the law like the AIA will take time to implement and fully
understand. Having a new, vague, and inadequately defined prior art
term like “otherwise available to the public” would leave many
patent applications open to denial and potentially many granted
patents vulnerable to lawsuits by competitors who are able to dig up
prior art that could fit into this potentially broad category of “or
otherwise available to the public.” Ultimately, such a threat would
likely be more harmful to small businesses that cannot afford to
defend against a lengthy lawsuit seeking to define a new prior art
term. Nor are such small companies likely to sue a competitor for
infringement on the basis that discovery to uncover evidence for such
a case and expert witnesses to frame the issue would likely be very
expensive as well.96 As a result, applying the more narrow definition
of “or otherwise available to the public” would reduce the risk and
costs associated with such a suit for small businesses.

93

Current
Fee
Schedule,
USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (last revised Jan. 16,
2014); Braun, supra note 48, at 63 (recognizing that derivation proceedings should
cost less than interference proceedings, due to their limited discovery as compared
to district court).
94
Conversation with Teresa Stanek Rea, Former Acting Director of the
USPTO and former Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property,
in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 24, 2014).
95
Id. Furthermore, the need for keeping records of an invention should not
come as a surprise to inventors given that they used to be needed for such
interference proceedings under the first to invent system. Even if such records are
not available, the presentation materials given by the inventor to the other party
should be available. Id.
96
Braun, supra note 48, at 63 (recognizing that discovery is one of the most
expensive parts of a lawsuit).
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All in all, the best advice to small businesses seems to be to
speak to a patent attorney early.97 This is particularly sound advice
as the patent community waits for judicial and administrative
clarification on ambiguities in the AIA.98 The counter argument that
the AIA places too much of a burden on a small business inventor to
speak to an attorney early in order to protect her investment is simply
insufficient. Presumably an attorney should be contacted in order to
help set up the business at which point inquiry into legal protections
for the invention could also be raised. The easiest way to preserve
the earliest possible filing date, especially if the inventor needs time
to arrange for financing, structuring the business, etc., is to file a
provisional patent application, providing the inventor one year to file
a complete patent application and maintaining the ability of future
foreign patents.99 Given the incentive from the first inventor to file
system to file early, it is possible that several provisional applications
will need to be filed.100
97

Barnes, supra note 84, at 30 (arguing in favor of inventors speaking to an
attorney “early and often”).
98
Kelly, supra note 11, at 410–11 (promoting a conservative approach while
the courts and USPTO work through interpreting the AIA, such as with “obvious
published disclosures” like a provisional patent application).
99
If filing costs are an issue for a provisional application, the main goal is to
make sure the invention is publicly disclosed so as to constitute prior art against
competitors while still preserving the inventor’s grace period. An alternative
suggestion proposed by Eric Kelly is to publish “a bare bones website where the
inventor puts the world on notice of their invention a year or less before they file
their non-provisional patent application.” It should be noted, however, that this
option could forfeit many foreign patents. Id. at 411. If obtaining a patent or
maintaining a trade secret are not of interest, one strategy to prevent competitors
from receiving a patent would be to make the invention available to the public and
thus bar their patentability. Barnes, supra note 84, at 33. As mentioned above, this
starts the clock on the one-year grace period if the inventor changes her mind and
bars patentability in many foreign countries. “This strategy should be used with
care.” Id. Additionally, the promotion of filing patents earlier then perhaps they
would have been prior to the AIA promotes the interests expressed in the
Constitution to “promote the useful arts.” Presumably, the earlier a patent is filed,
the sooner society can begin to benefit from the shared knowledge and expand on
it.
100
This may particularly be the case if the invention is still undergoing
development but there are some parts of the invention that are ready for patenting.
See Quinn, supra note 37 (encouraging the inventors to file “serial provisional
patent applications prior to filing a non-provisional patent application that wraps
everything together”). While cost is likely to be a concern for the small business in
this scenario, it is possible she can arrange for a reduced attorneys fee for the
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ADVANTAGES IN JOINDER CHANGES UNDER THE AIA

Prior to the AIA, some courts hearing patent cases applied a
minority interpretation of joinder under Rules 19 and 20 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.101 This interpretation allowed the
plaintiff, in many cases a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE), to join into
one suit an unlimited number of defendants who did not have to have
any relationship to one another, but who all allegedly merely
infringed the same patent. 102 This aided the PAEs in maximizing
their profits by only having to potentially file and defend one lawsuit,
in one jurisdiction, as compared to hundreds all around the
country.103 This was also to the PAEs’ advantage given the high cost
of litigating a case to trial, estimated to be as high as $4 million,104
and the low likelihood of a PAE’s success, which has been estimated
around 24%. 105 In part for these reasons, and because small
businesses do not generally have the financial resources to defend
lengthy lawsuits, PAEs tend to sue more small businesses than large
provisional applications, permitting a little less than a year to acquire outside
funding before the non-provisional patent application is due.
101
See Bui, supra note 14, at 453. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
20(a)(2)(A)–(B) states that defendants may be joined when the claims “aris[e] out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and
“any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”
102
Id. at 453. It is a common strategy for PAEs, a subset of NPEs, to file suit
against “dozens” of defendants. Liu, supra note 2, at 491. Despite this being a
minority interpretation, plaintiffs’ ability to forum shop meant the impact could be
wide. Id. at 504. The districts applying such an interpretation included the District
of Kansas, the Northern District of Texas, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and
notably, the Eastern District of Texas. Id. at 491, 500, 502.
103
Often PAEs are not interested in going through trial with hundreds of
defendants but are trying to corner potential infringers into licensing the invention
or settling the case. See Liu, supra note 2, at 493 (recognizing that the large
majority of cases brought by NPEs will settle, possibly at a rate of more than 95%);
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). PAEs are able to potentially sue thousands of parties
because they are able to sue end-users, or those parties who are using a product that
contains infringing material, despite an unawareness of the infringement. Liu,
supra note 2, at 498–99.
104
Liu, supra note 2, at 493 (citing Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 481 (2012)).
105
Id. (pointing to one Pricewaterhouse Cooper study that estimated PAE
success at 24.3% and a Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse study estimating PAE
success at 24.1%).
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businesses, and small businesses are more likely to settle, making the
chances of a payout more likely.106
Chapter 29 of title 35 of the United States Code amends §
299(a)(1-2) to now require that parties be joined together only if:
(1) any right to relief is asserted against the parties
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences relating to the
making, using, importing into the United States,
offering for sale, or selling of the same accused
product or process; and
(2) questions of fact common to all defendants or
counterclaim defendants will arise in the action.107
§ 299(b) makes it explicit that “accused infringers may not be joined
in one action as defendants . . . based solely on allegations that they
each have infringed the patent or patents in suit.” 108 In addition,
Congress closed the loophole that would have permitted cases to be
consolidated for trial based on Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 109
The AIA has made clear that the minority
interpretation is not acceptable in patent cases and instead both
prongs of the analysis must be completed. Furthermore, it is
insufficient to join unrelated parties because they may have infringed
the same invention. In many cases, this removes an important
strategic decision from the plaintiff and reduces the likelihood of
forum shopping.110 One possible explanation for this change is that
106

Id. at 494–95. One study found the median defendant sued by an NPE
brings in less than $11 million in revenue each year and another study that found
55% of PAE defendants bring in less than $10 million in revenue each year. Id.
Additionally, it is estimated a small-medium sized business will pay about
$500,000 in litigation costs. Id.
107
35 U.S.C. § 299(a)(1)–(2).
108
§ 299(b).
109
FED. R. CIV. P. 42; Matal, supra note 2, at 592 (quoting Senator Kyl’s
acknowledgment that it would have been against the intention of Congress for a
plaintiff to go around § 299 by applying Rule 42).
110
Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting
Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 673, 703 (2012) (recognizing that small
businesses with limited locations will likely be able to prevent PAEs from
transferring venue to a more desired location, assuming defendants are unable to
transfer the venue to their own preferred venue already).
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Congress perceived the joinder of many small business inventors in
patent suits to be “predatory behavior.”111 One study, for example,
found that 55% of defendants in NPE cases are businesses that have
less than $10 million. 112
This suggests that NPEs are
disproportionately targeting smaller businesses, likely in hopes of a
quick settlement rather than the expense of a long trial. 113 This
clarification in the law will also negatively impact plaintiffs who will
be less likely to benefit from economies of scale by joining multiple
defendants, which will ultimately lead to an increase in the cost of
litigating the infringement. 114 Now, plaintiffs will either have to
defend multiple lawsuits against small businesses, in multiple venues
or they will have to defend fewer suits against larger companies,
likely more willing to go through trial rather than settle.115
VII.

ADVANTAGES OF THE REVISED FEE STRUCTURE AT THE
USPTO

Another important improvement the AIA made was to adjust
the fee structure to better reflect the type of entity. To do this, the
AIA further broke up the fees based on business size and exposure to
the patent world, expanding now to three categories: one for general
fees, another for small entities, and a third for micro entities.116 A
111

See AIA § 30, 125 Stat. at 339 (“It is the sense of Congress that the patent
system should . . . protect[] the rights of small businesses and inventors from
predatory behavior that could result in the cutting of innovation.”); Liu, supra note
2, at 490–91 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 112-98 at 54 (2011)) (noting the legislative
history suggests the “purpose of the provision was to address the scenario in which
defendants tenuous connections to the underlying disputes are joined by the dozens,
a common strategy of NPEs”).
112
Liu, supra note 2, at 490 (citing Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent
Trolls, (Sept. 28, 2012) (unpublished Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research
Paper
No.
09-12),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251 (last visited Apr. 6,
2014)).
113
From Exposing NPE Myths to Explaining NPE Math, RPX CORPORATION,
http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageID=14&itemID=25 (last visited Jan. 17,
2014) (recognizing that of 971 NPE litigations studied, 95% of them settled).
114
Bui, supra note 14, at 453 (warning that the new § 299 could also lead to
“inconsistent claim construction[]”).
115
See Brown, supra note 35, at 1261; see also supra note 2 (discussing the
increased number of patent litigation suits which was in part due to the new joinder
rules under the AIA).
116
See generally AIA § 10, 125 Stat. at 316–17.
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small entity includes businesses with less than 500 employees and
“which ha[ve] not assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed . . . any
rights to the invention to any person who could not be classified as an
independent inventor or to any concern which would not qualify as a
non-profit organization or small business concern.”117 A small entity
can also include an “independent inventor or nonprofit organization”
so long as the above limitation of transferring invention rights has not
been violated.118 A micro entity is defined as a party that qualifies as
a small entity and (1) is the named inventor on no more than four
non-provisional patent applications (excluding foreign filed
applications); (2) had a gross income of no more than “3 times the
median household income for that preceding calendar year”; and (3)
“has not assigned, granted, or conveyed, and is not under an
obligation by contract or law to assign, grant, or convey, a license or
other ownership interest in the application” to another party that
would not independently meet the demands of (2).119 If a party meets
either of these qualifications, then the general fees for “filing,
searching, examining, issuing, appealing, and maintaining patent
applications and patents” will be reduced by “50 percent” for small
entities and “75 percent” for micro entities.120 Further cost savings of
$200 for small and micro entities can be realized by filing patent
applications electronically.121
The table below provides a few key examples of cost savings
in real numbers for each of the three fee categories.122
Fee Description

General
Fee

Small
Entity

Micro
Entity

Basic Utility Patent Filing

$280.00

$140.00

$70.00

Provisional Patent Filing

$260.00

$130.00

$65.00

Utility Patent Search

$600.00

$300.00

$150.00

Utility Patent Examination

$720.00

$360.00

$180.00

117

Bui, supra note 14, at 447–48 n.52 (citing the Small Business Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 631–657).
118
Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(1)–(3)).
119
AIA § 10(g)(1)(a)(1)–(4), 125 Stat. at 318.
120
AIA § 10(b), 125 Stat. at 318.
121
AIA § 10(h), 125 Stat. at 319.
122
See Current Fee Schedule, supra note 93.
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7.5 Years Patent Maintenance
Fee
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Maintenance Fee
Priority Examination Request
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$1,600.00

$800.00

$400.00

$3,600.00

$1,800.00

$900.00

$7,400.00

$3,700.00

$1,850.00

$4,000.00

$2,000.00

$1,000.00

As the table illustrates, the fees to apply for and maintain a
patent can be weighty. However, over the life of a patent, the savings
to a small entity or micro entity can also be significant, possibly
saving thousands just in the application stage. These are important
cost savings for such entities given that many will also have start-up
business costs, among other costs to take into consideration.
The main concerns with the costs to the small business
inventor however, are not generally with the fees from the USPTO.
Rather, large portions of the costs attributed to patenting an invention
are associated with attorneys’ fees and litigation. 123 While this is
true, the AIA took steps at curbing these costs through administrative
review processes, such as post grant review 124 and inter partes
review, the latter of which will be addressed in the next Part.
Furthermore, while the costs of attorneys’ fees and litigation for
small businesses can be a legitimate concern, given the already
dramatic changes the AIA encompassed, it seems unreasonable to
123

Braun, supra note 48, at 58–59 (estimating that attorneys’ fees for filing a
simple patent can run thousands of dollars, with more complicated patent
applications costing about $15,000). This should be compared with the estimated
cost of litigating a patent case as discussed supra notes 100, 104, and 106.
124
See Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review
of Patents, 17 UCLA J.L. & T ECH., 1, 22–23 (2013). While this Note will not
include an analysis of post grant review, it also has the potential to save the client
both time and money as compared to litigation in district court. See also id. at 2–3,
6–7, 19, 22–23. New post-grant review procedures can be raised by a petitioner or
by the Director of the USPTO when “a novel or unsettled legal question that is
important to other patents or patent applications” is raised and as such must be filed
in the first nine months of the patent being granted. Id. at 2. Importantly,
petitioners in post-grant review can include any non-owner of the patent, such as
third party interest groups, who are not subject to standing requirements as in
federal court. Id. at 2–3. The petitions are restricted to issues that can be raised
under section 282(b), paragraphs (2) and (3), including grounds related to
patentability such as “patent eligible subject matter, non-obviousness, and novelty.”
Id. at 6–7.
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have tried to take on such a polarizing issue in the same piece of
legislation, likely jeopardizing the very passage of the AIA. The
measures taken to curb fees for small entities and micro entities were
appropriate given the scope of the AIA.
VIII.

ADVANTAGES OF INTER PARTES REVIEW

Prior to the AIA, third parties had available to them an
uncontested inter partes reexamination procedure that has since been
replaced with a contested inter partes review proceeding, 125 held
before the PTAB.126 The inter partes review serves as an alternative
to bringing a claim in district court; however, as will be examined,
there are some timing restrictions for such filings.127 The prior inter
partes reexamination proceeding standard that required a “substantial
new question of patentability” has been changed under the AIA’s
inter partes review to a higher standard requiring “a showing that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the requester would prevail with
respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged.”128 Additionally, the
burden of proof is lower in an inter partes review proceeding,
125

See Bui, supra note 14, at 459 (inter partes review is a way for non-patent
owners to challenge granted patents. The process is conducted by the USPTO’s
PTAB rather than a court.).
126
Miller & Archibald, supra note 13, at 151; UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK Office, INTER PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA–SEPTEBER [sic]
30,
2013,
(Sept.
30,
2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.
pdf. The prior inter partes reexamination proceedings were granted 93% of the
time, took an average of 36 months, and contained 76%, or 1449 filings, that were
“known to be in litigation.” Yasser El-Gamal & Ehab M. Samuel, Address at the
Orange County Patent Law Association Monthly Meeting: The New Battlefield:
Patent Review Proceedings Under the America Invents Act (Oct. 17, 2013).
Preliminary IPR numbers suggest a similarly high number of proceedings are
granted. Id. Of the 483 petitions filed as of September 15, 2013, 156 had been
granted and 24 had been denied. Id. Thus far, the inter partes review proceedings
have already totaled more in the first year of availability than all of the inter parte
reexamination proceedings from the prior nine years. Id.
127
Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 618 (2012).
128
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 305 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 319(c)(3)(i)(I)(aa)–
(bb)); see also Douglas Duff, The Reexamination Power of Patent Infringers and
the Forgotten Inventor, 41 CAP. U.L. REV. 693, 718 (2013) (recognizing that many
patent practitioners believe this to be a higher standard for inter partes review, even
though the author anticipates petitions to be granted at or near the inter partes
reexamination rate of 95%).
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requiring only a “preponderance of the evidence”129 as compared to
the district court standard of “clear and convincing” evidence.130
Section 6 of the AIA permits a non patent owner131 to file a
request for an inter partes review and limits it to questions that can be
raised under §§ 102 and 103 grounds “and only on the basis of prior
art consisting of patents or printed publications.”132 Such requests
may be filed either after the termination of a post-grant review or
nine months after a patent has been granted.133 The Director of the
USPTO will either grant or deny the request within three months of
either receiving a preliminary response from the patent owner or by
the deadline and such decisions are not appealable.134 Additionally, a
prior civil action filed by the petitioner will bar an inter partes review
and any civil action filed on or after filing an inter partes review will
be stayed. 135 Furthermore, an inter partes review is barred if it is
filed more than one year after an infringement complaint has been
filed against the petitioner. 136 The AIA also provides the patent
129

AIA § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 303 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 316 (e)).
See Bui, supra note 14, at 459, note 135 (citing Microsoft v. i4i, 131 S. Ct.
2238 (2011)).
131
See AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 300 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2))
(clarifying that any petitioner, however, must identify “all real parties in interest”);
see also Duff, supra note 128, at 698 (pointing out that the requirement to identify
all parties under the new inter partes review is a change over the ex parte
reexamination requirements where unidentified third parties can file multiple
examinations against a patent owner since that party is able to remain completely
anonymous).
132
AIA § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 299 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311(a)–(b)).
133
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 299 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)). This applies to
first to file patents only. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Technical Corrections,
Pub. L. No. 112-274, § 1(d), 126 Stat. 2456, 2456 (2013) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §
311(c)). In early 2013, Congress revised the AIA to permit first to invent patents
(filed prior to the March 16, 2013, first to file start date) to file for inter partes
review without waiting the nine months. Id.
134
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 300 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), (b), (d)). At
this point, if the Director approves the inter partes review, the Director also has the
discretion to join the inter partes review with other petitions that have reached this
point. Id.; see AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 301 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 315(c)); AIA
§ 6, 125 Stat. at 301 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 315(d)). Additionally, if there
are multiple proceedings in front of the Office, the Director has the discretion to
adjust the “manner in which the inter partes review or other proceeding or matter
may proceed, including providing for stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination.”
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 301 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 315(d)).
135
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 300–01 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)–(2)).
136
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 301 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)).
130
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owner with an opportunity “to move to amend the patent,” by either
canceling specific claims or by “propos[ing] a reasonable number of
substitute claims.”137 Once a final decision has been made regarding
the inter partes review, the petitioner is estopped from raising “any
ground . . . raised or reasonably could have [been] raised during that
inter partes review.”138 Final decisions on inter partes reviews must
be made generally within one year; however, the Director may
extend for up to an additional six months with good cause or may
make other adjustments if parties are joined.139 All decisions shall be
made by the PTAB and those decisions may be appealed.140
Arguments against the new inter partes review include that it
is too costly, thus burdening patent owners, 141 that the estoppel
procedures unfairly prevent future actions, 142 that real parties in
interest must be named,143 and that the higher standard discourages
participation.144 The cost for filing an inter partes review request is
$9000 and the institution fee if the request is granted is $14,000, plus
the attorneys’ fees.145 In addition, the parties may conduct discovery
related to the patent invalidity claims, which will increase the overall
cost and burden the patent owner’s time.146 Given that the time and
expense for discovery can be great, this would burden small
businesses more than large companies. Additionally, the ability of
one party to raise an inter partes review while a third party has raised
a different proceeding against the same inventor—say for example a
post grant review—could provide an unfair loophole for those third

137

AIA § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 302 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §316(a)(9), (d)).
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 301–02 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2)). This
includes matters raised in civil actions and matters raised before the International
Trade Commission.
139
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 302 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11)).
140
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 303–05 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(c), 319).
141
Duff, supra note 128, at 721 (arguing that the time and expense for
discovery place a great burden on patent owners).
142
Bui, supra note 14, at 462.
143
Id.
144
Trilling, supra note 5, at 250.
145
Current Fee Schedule, supra note 93. Both fees have a claim limit. Any
claims beyond twenty for the inter partes review request will be charged $200 per
claim and any claim beyond the 15 limit for the institution fee will be charged $400
per claim. Id.
146
Duff, supra note 128, at 719 (citing 35 U.S.C.A. § 316(a)(5)).
138
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parties that require the patent owner to defend multiple proceedings
at once or back to back.147
The higher standard for inter partes review, requiring a
reasonable likelihood of “prevail[ing] with respect to at least 1 of the
claims” may also serve to discourage use of the inter partes review.148
If it is perceived to be easier to meet the standard in district court,
companies may be more willing to pay the added cost and wait
longer in order to have a better opportunity at winning the case. This
may be particularly true if the petitioner is a larger company and the
patent owner is a smaller company that does not have a comparable
legal budget. This would provide the larger company with a strategic
advantage to going to district court rather than the less expensive and
faster inter partes review.
While it is true that the inter partes review allows discovery,
the AIA took steps to restrict the discovery in time and scope, and
therefore cost. As Senator Kyl noted, one of the motivations for
limiting discovery was to reduce the burden placed on patent owners,
particularly when the proceeding is raised years past when the patent
was granted.149 Firstly, the PTAB has at most eighteen months, and
generally, only twelve months, from the time the petition for review
is granted to issue a decision. 150 This means that the time for
discovery must be limited in order to permit enough time for the rest
of the review to proceed and be completed. The discovery is also
limited in scope in that only patentability claims based on §§ 102 and
103 can be raised, and even then, it is narrowed to patents and printed
publications. 151 Furthermore, discovery, as dictated under §
316(a)(5)(A-B), is limited to witness depositions providing
147

Id. at 721 (suggesting such a scenario provides an unfair loophole in the
estoppel provisions of the AIA).
148
STEPHEN M. HANKINS & D. CHRISTOPHER OHLY, PATENT REFORM 2011:
THE MOST SIGINIFICANT CHANGE IN PATENT LAW IN 50 YEARS, SCHIFF HARDIN
LLP
(Sept.
29,
2011),
http://www.schiffhardin.com/File%20Library/Publications%20(File%20Based)/PD
F/ip_092911.pdf.
149
Matal, supra note 2, at 621.
150
AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 302 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11)).
151
Stephan Blum, Ex Parte Reexamination: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, 73
OHIO ST. L.J. 395, 431 (2012). Inter partes review’s restriction of claims are only
to be based on those under §§ 102-103, and even then only for patents and printed
publications. Id. This is appropriate given that the patent has been granted by an
examiner and because the nine month time frame to raise a broader claim under
post-grant review has expired. Id.
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“affidavits or declarations” and “what is otherwise necessary in the
interest of justice.”152 While this latter category seems broad at first
glance,153 when combined with the fact that the scope is limited to
patents and printed publications, it is likely narrow enough to prevent
any significant abuse of time or financial resources.
Additionally, while it may be possible that multiple third
parties could raise unrelated post grant review and inter partes review
proceedings close in time with one another, it does not mean the AIA
is without protection for patent owners. Rather, the AIA permits the
Director, when there are multiple proceedings before the Office
related to the one patent, to “provid[e] for stay, transfer,
consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding.”154
This discretion would allow the Director to only require a patent
owner to defend one proceeding at a time or possibly consolidate the
matters, particularly if the issues are related to one another. This
would be of great importance to a small business in helping to
manage the expense of defending such actions and helping to prevent
larger competitors from ganging up on the small business with
multiple proceedings.
The new inter partes review procedures also protect patent
owners—primarily small businesses—through the estoppel rules.155

152

AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 302 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5)(A)–(B));
see also Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, IPR2012-00001, Paper
26, 1, 5 (Mar. 5, 2013) (acknowledging that discovery in inter partes review
proceedings is more limited than in district court and has the benefit of “lower[ing]
the cost, minimiz[ing] the complexity, and shorten[ing] the period required for
dispute resolution”).
153
See also Garmin Int’l, IPR2012-00001, Paper 26, at 5–7, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/ipr201200001_comprehensive_discussion_of_discovery_standards.pdf (last visited Apr.
12, 2014). The legislative intent as expressed by Senator Kyl was for the Patent
and Trademark Office to “be conservative in its grants of discovery.” Id. at 5. As
the PTAB Administrative Judge further noted, when evaluating the standard of
“necessary in the interest of justice,” factors such as whether there is “More Than
A Possibility And Mere Allegation” of finding useful information is present,
whether the party has the “Ability To Generate Equivalent Information By Other
Means,” whether the questions given had “Easily Understandable Instructions,”
and whether the request made was “overly burdensome to answer, given the
expedited nature of Inter Partes Review.” Id. at 6–7.
154
See supra note 134.
155
Kesan, supra note 54, at 237–38 (recognizing the estoppel rules will help
restrict the chances that inter partes review is “used to simply delay and harass
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By preventing any future inter partes reviews related to that claim
that either were raised in the prior proceeding or “reasonably could
have [been] raised,” the AIA is limiting the number of proceedings
that a patent owner must defend against or that a petitioner may
raise. 156 This will disproportionately benefit small businesses
because as the patent owner they will not have to defend against as
many proceedings, since all related claims must be raised together. It
also disproportionately benefits the small business petitioner because
it is less likely that a small business will want to spare the expense of
raising multiple proceedings. This is more likely the tactic of a wellfunded larger business. Lastly, the estoppel rules also prevent any
future civil actions or International Trade Commission actions based
on the claims that were raised or could have been raised in an inter
partes review.157 Similarly, if a civil action is filed prior to an inter
partes review, the inter partes review may not be granted. In this
way, the AIA is again protecting against multiple actions related to
the same claims. Due to the expense of addressing multiple
proceedings, this will also disproportionately benefit smaller
businesses with smaller legal budgets.
Furthermore, the requirement that all parties in interest must
be listed helps ensure that a party that has already raised a specific
claim or claim that should have been raised does not raise any future
claims.
This has been the case with anonymous ex parte
reexamination proceedings. Again, because this is not likely to have
been a tactic of a small business given the expense of raising multiple
actions, this rule largely disfavors larger businesses and PAEs trying
to prevent association between multiple actions.
Overall, the cost savings, as compared to raising or defending
the same issues in district court, benefit the small business owner
regardless of whether she is the patent owner or the petitioner. The
limited timeline, restricted discovery, and future estoppel protections
prevent the costs from rising for both parties, but proportionally will
benefit smaller businesses more, given their limited legal budgets,
patentees, and to impose unnecessary costs on patentees who are small
companies”).
156
See AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 301–02 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)).
This would mean that with every successful defense of an inter partes review, the
patent’s legitimacy and value should increase. This would be the case because a
patent that has been successfully defended in inter partes review now has fewer
future challenges that can be brought against it.
157
Miller & Archibald, supra note 13, at 155.
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and therefore make inter partes review a feasible alternative to
district court.158
IX.

POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS

While the AIA is not without advantages for small businesses,
it is also true that at times it benefits larger companies more. To help
maintain a balance, there are several possible improvements
Congress should consider making in order to help ensure larger
companies are not favored to the detriment of smaller companies.
It seems the greatest impact on small businesses and deterrent
for protecting their patent rights is cost; cost of USPTO fees and
attorneys’ fees for patent prosecution and litigation. To help address
this concern, the fee schedule should be further revised, specifically,
adjusting the total cost downward 50% for small entities and 75% for
micro entities seeking derivation proceedings, post grant review, and
inter partes review, and the corresponding institution fees. 159 The
fees for each of these categories, as based on the current fee schedule,
after applying the corresponding reductions are indicated below160:
General Fee

Small
Entity

Micro
Entity

$400.00

$200.00

$100.00

Post Grant Review

$12,000.00

$6000.00

$3000.00

Post Grant Review
Institution Fee

$18,000.00

$9000.00

$4500.00

Inter Partes Review

$9000.00

$4500.00

$1125.00

Inter Partes Review
Institution Fee

$14,000.00

$7000.00

$3500.00

Fee Description
Derivation Proceeding

Of course, the fees are only one small part of the costs to small
businesses protecting their patent rights. The larger share of that
burden stems from attorneys’ fees. To help support small businesses,
158

Bui, supra note 14, at 461 (finding that the new inter partes review will be
“cheaper, easier, and significantly expedited” as compared to district court).
159
Current Fee Schedule, supra note 93.
160
See id.
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the AIA required the Director of the USPTO to assist in creating pro
bono programs in conjunction with intellectual property law
associations throughout the country.161 Still, it may be possible for
future legislation to include attorney fee shifting to the losing party,
similar to federal courts, for frivolous inter partes review or post
grant review proceedings.162 While it is generally accepted that both
proceedings will already cost less in time and money than similar
proceedings in district court, such fee shifting would help deter
predatory suits against small businesses by larger companies or PAEs
trying to encourage a settlement from a company that cannot afford
the time or legal costs. In this way, the fee shifting for frivolous suits
will encourage small businesses to defend the action on the merits,
rather than settle due to a lack of resources. It is also possible that
legislation could be written to encourage more contingency fee
arrangements for certain actions or third-party financing for those
seeking injunctions.163
Regarding § 102 prior art, Congress should clarify the
language used in order to make clear the meaning of whether private
uses and sales are public disclosures and if so under what
circumstances. The courts, of course, could also make this
clarification; however, it would be more useful if Congress clarified
the point to prevent expensive litigation on the matter. In order to
maintain a balance between the benefits of the AIA to small and large
companies, this interpretation should be made to reflect a
modification of public use and on sale only, and not as a fifth
category to prior art. The AIA has already made a number of
significant changes to the U.S. patent system without small
businesses trying to decipher what “or otherwise available to the
public” means as its own category. The vagueness in such a category
could tie up small business patent holders in litigation for years.

161

AIA § 32, 125 Stat. at 340; see Pro Se and Pro Bono, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/proseprobono/ (last modified Nov. 6, 2013). The
link provides resources for small businesses, available in forty-seven of the fifty
states. Such resources include listing of attorneys and agents, Intellectual Property
Law Clinics in the community, resource centers, and organizations to assist
inventors.
162
Duff, supra note 128, at 724–25 (citing Mark D. Janis, Rethinking
Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent
Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 51 (1997)).
163
Kesan, supra note 54, at 235.
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Regarding inter partes review, Congress should require that
both the PTAB in inter partes review proceedings as well as the
Federal Courts reviewing the same issue of invalidity use the same
standard. The distinct standards, with the one used by the PTAB
being seen as a higher standard, could dissuade parties from using the
inter partes review proceedings, which were intended to be used as an
alternative to the courts for similar matters. Just as important, the
perceived lower standard further incentivizes large companies and
PAEs to use the courts, which will be more costly to a small business
adversary, again encouraging the likelihood of the company settling
prematurely. While the lure of a shorter and less costly proceeding is
enticing for any company, inter partes review would be more
attractive with a more similar standard to the courts.
X.

CONCLUSION

The changes made by the AIA are substantial and will
undoubtedly take time to understand fully. In addition, there are still
areas where the legislation can be improved upon. Overall, the AIA
takes necessary steps in moving the U.S. patent system forward by
harmonizing it with the rest of the world and in turn protecting
domestic patent applicants from losing foreign patent rights.
But the AIA does something else too. It helps promote the
constitutional values on which the patent system was founded. As
mentioned in the introduction, the pre-AIA system resulted in too
many inappropriately granted patents, leaving a cost to society,
patent owners defending an action, and competitors challenging a
granted patent. Now, due to the motivation to file patents quickly,
patent attorneys will need to ensure the submitted patent does not
overextend itself by including claims that are overbroad.164 This is
because, with the more moderate costs associated with proceedings
such as inter partes review, it is possible more patents will be
challenged for validity.165 As a result, patent applications should be
written to prevent invalidation if challenged and to dissuade such
challenges in the first place, ultimately making the patent more
valuable, particularly for venture capitalists interested in investing in

164

Jay P. Kesan, Closing Statement: Not Yet Time for a Verdict, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNumbra 248, 249 (2012).
165
Cionca, supra note 58, at 14; id. at 249.
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small businesses with strong patents. 166 Ultimately, these patents
will also ensure that society is not granting limited monopolies
undeservingly.
After comparing specific areas of the pre-AIA legislation and
the AIA, it is clear that there are significant advantages in the law for
small businesses. Most significantly, the AIA, by better aligning the
U.S. with the rest of the world, helps prevent small businesses from
inadvertently losing their foreign patent rights. This alone helps
protect the value of the small businesses invention in a way that the
pre-AIA laws did not. Additionally, a narrow interpretation of § 102
prior art would also protect the unsuspecting small business from
accidentally disclosing an invention in a private environment,
clearing up years of judicial interpretation that seem counterintuitive.
Another important change the AIA makes is in the more stringent
joinder rules. These rules largely favor small businesses that are
attacked by PAEs unsuspectingly, or larger companies.
By
preventing unfair joinder of small businesses, they are better able to
defend themselves in a local jurisdiction, reducing the cost of
litigation. Also, there is the very real possibility that the joinder rules
will disincentivize PAE’s from targeting small businesses in the
numbers they used to. As a result, it is possible we will see a shift in
PAE strategy towards larger businesses, ultimately hoping for fewer
but larger payouts from judgments versus the prior multiple but
smaller payouts from settlements.
In regard to fees, the AIA makes fair and appropriate strides
in lessening the burden on the very small businesses, particularly
those that qualify as a micro entity. This helps promote the
individual inventor in her garage who does not regularly file patents,
but who has a good invention and deserves a patent. Many were
disappointed that the AIA did not better address the larger issue
impacting the small business, attorneys’ fees. However, the
regulation of attorneys’ fees in only one area of law seems unlikely.
That does not mean it is not possible to help make access to legal
representation more feasible for the small inventor, but that it will
likely not come by way of legislation. Rather it will likely be by way
of private businesses, non-profits, and associations, offering pro-bono
or low cost representation. Lastly, the advantages provided to small
businesses through proceedings such as the inter partes review better
166

Kesan, Closing Statement, supra note 164, at 249–50.
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help protect their right by providing a lower cost and reduced time
alternative to litigation. To help further ensure the process is
fulfilling its objectives, the AIA leaves significant discretion to the
USPTO Director to help protect against abuses of the system towards
small businesses, such as through staying or terminating a duplicative
proceeding.
Ultimately, the AIA strikes a strong balance between
promoting the U.S. patent system, constitutional objectives, and the
needs of the small business patent applicant. Hopefully, future
legislation will continue this progress to add further clarifications and
protections, but for now, the AIA has given small businesses a good
start.

